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Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of environmental standards by
studying the role of income inequality and freedom of the press. Given that evidence of
the environmental Kuznets curve has only been found for some countries, it is thus cru-
cial to investigate whether other factors besides income per capita levels may be affecting
countries’ decisions to pass environmentally-friendly legislation. We investigate the effects
that inequality and freedom of the press have on environmental stringency for a sample of
OECD and BRIICS countries and a global sample of 82 countries using data over the period
1994–2015. We hypothesize that the more unequal a society is, and the greater the oppres-
sion of the press is, the less stringent environmental policies are. The results partially confirm
our hypothesis. In particular, lack of press freedom is negatively correlated with environ-
mental stringency, whereas inequality shows a non-linear effect only for non-high-income
countries.
Keywords: environmentalKuznets curve; environmental stringency; freedomof the press; inequality; panel
data
JEL Classification: Q0; Q1; Q3; Q50; Q56
1. Introduction
Whereas numerous studies have investigated the effects of economic growth on the
environment (Beckerman, 1992; Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Stern et al., 1996; and
Stern, 2004, 2017; among others), less attention has been given to other factors relat-
ing to a country’s income level, in particular inequality levels and freedom of the press,
which can potentially affect pollution levels and environmental policies (Barrett and
Graddy, 2000; Coondoo and Dinda, 2008; Grunewald et al., 2017). While Barrett and
Graddy (2000) focused on freedom of the press, Magnani (2000), Coondoo and Dinda
(2008) and Grunewald et al. (2017) focused on income distribution and inequality. To
the best of our knowledge, the two aspects have not been considered simultaneously in
the corresponding empirical literature, despite the fact of being related. Additionally, the
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theories explaining why some countries have largely embraced environmental policies
while others have been more reluctant have scarcely been investigated.
We propose bridging this gap in the literature by studying the effects of inequality and
freedomof the press on environmental standards in developed and developing countries.
The main novelty of this paper is to use the Gini coefficient as the measure of inequal-
ity, and the level of freedom of the press as a proxy for civil liberties, to investigate the
effects these factorsmight have on the level of environmental stringency and on environ-
mental policy, for the years 1994–2015, using a sample of OECD+BRIICS1 countries
and a global sample comprising 82 countries. We hypothesize that the more unequal
a society is, and the greater the oppression of the press is, the less stringent environ-
mental policies are. A possible explanation for this could be that more people will vote
for policies that will increase their economic wealth rather than policies that increase
environmental quality, in order to catch up to the perceived income norm.
In general, our results suggest that both variables – inequality and press freedom –
show significant correlations with environmental policy, but the results are more
nuanced than initially suspected. In particular, we find that only for non-high income
countries is increasing inequality negatively correlated with stringency of environmental
regulation, which is potentially detrimental for environmental quality. The results for
environmental tax revenues, however, are less robust. With respect to press freedom, we
find that it is significantly and positively correlated to environmental stringency and to
environmental tax revenues. This indicates that freedomof the pressmakes itmore likely
that people accept a monetary loss to the benefit of the environment. This is especially
relevant for non-rich countries, for which the results show a more robust effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 revises the closely-related litera-
ture and section 3 describes themain data and variables. The empiricalmodel is specified
in section 4, where the main results are also presented and discussed. Finally, section 5
concludes.
2. Literature review
In this sectionwe summarize the literature that is closely related to the focal relationships
studied in this paper, namely those between environmental degradation, income and
income inequality, freedom of speech and environmental regulations.
We start by briefly referring to the vast literature on the environmental Kuznets
curve (EKC) linking environmental degradation with income per capita. In general, the
consensus on the EKC is unclear because the findings vary greatly depending on the
years examined, the pollutants investigated, and the countries considered (Grossman
and Krueger, 1995). Stern (2004) reviews the EKC literature and finds that developing
countries have already acknowledged the detrimental effects of environmental degrada-
tion and started to take action in the late 1990s, disregarding the EKC’s hypothesis stating
that environmental quality would improve without the need for policy actions when a
certain level ofGDPper capita is reached. The author highlights theweak statistical foun-
dation on which the EKC stands and proposes that the new decomposition and efficient
frontier models can help reveal the true relationship between GDP per capita and envi-
ronment (Stern, 2004). The more recent literature indicates that an EKC is expected for
local pollutants, but not necessarily for global ones, such as CO2 (Carlsson and Lund-
ström, 2003; Carson, 2010; Stern, 2017). Carson (2010) suggests that the focus should be
1The BRIICS countries are Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa.
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shifted to investigating the transmission channels that affect the income-environment
relationship and Stern (2017) concludes that other factors rather than economic growth
have been reducing pollution. For instance, environmental policies and regulations are
especially relevant for global public goods as in the case of reducing global warming.
A number of authors have argued that environmental degradation is not only related
to income per capita but also to income inequality (Boyce, 1994; Scruggs, 1998;Magnani,
2000; Grunewald et al., 2017). The argument was already put forward in the 1990s. Boyce
(1994) shows that when power and wealth are greatly unequal, higher levels of environ-
mental degradation result. Boyce uses the term ‘power-weighted social decision rule’ to
describe his hypothesis that if the winners are very powerful and the losers have in com-
parison very little power, thenmore environmental degradation will occur. Boyce (1994)
shows that this is theoretically possible, as long as the winners benefit in the long run.
Scruggs (1998) challenges Boyce’s (1994) paper by reinvestigating whether lower
levels of inequality always lead to lower levels of environmental degradations, finding
that this depends on several factors. Scruggs argues that Boyce’s argument is incorrect
because it assumes that as a person’s income increases, his or her demand for envi-
ronmental degradation also increases, and this is often not the case. Contrary to Boyce
(1994), Scruggs (1998) also argues that the democratic social choices are not always the
best solutions for public goods problems and themain outcomes depend on the distribu-
tion of preferences among different income groups and the role of the institutions in the
country. Even if a country is more democratic, it does not mean that the best decisions
are always made. Scruggs (1998) concludes that it is a combination of factors that in the
end leads to more ecological decisions.
Magnani (2000) adds inequality as an additional determinant of environmental
quality in an EKC framework, arguing that it is mainly a relative income effect, and
the political framework of the countries that determine the policy decisions that are
taken in a country. Moreover, she stresses the importance of appropriately control-
ling for unobserved country heterogeneity. Unobserved country heterogeneity could
be present, because individuals in different countries react to price and income effects
in dissimilar ways. Moreover, there could be other unobserved cultural determinants
of environmental outcomes. Magnani (2000) uses as environmental outcome OECD
data on public R&D expenditure for environmental protection for the years 1980–1991.
She finds that the income distribution functions differently in predicting environmental
degradation from what would be expected by the EKC.
Magnani (2000) also investigates if relative income effects could cause the turning
point in the EKC. If individuals are more concerned with how much wealth they have
compared to other citizens, as opposed to how high their income level is in absolute
terms, then we would expect the income distribution to also have an effect on the tip-
ping point of the individuals. The results fromMagnani’s analysis show support for her
hypothesis that inequality affects public environmental expenditure. Although a neg-
ative correlation was found between public environmental expenditure and inequality,
the results were not robust. Furthermore, Magnani (2000) also considered the inequality
ratios – that is, the 20 to 80 per cent ratio and the 10 to 90 per cent ratio – and finds that
these ratios have a negative and significant effect on public environmental expenditure.
The effect of inequality on emissions has been further investigated in Grunewald et al.
(2017). The authors applied a new estimator that endogenously groups countries accord-
ing to data and allows for group-specific linear trends in the dependent variable, group
fixed effects, and is less demanding in terms of degrees of freedom and variability within
units and over time of the target variables than a fixed effects estimator. Their findings
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X20000339
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 85.52.213.56, on 26 Jan 2021 at 14:50:20, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
540 Inma Martínez-Zarzoso and Jennifer Phillips
indicate that higher income inequality is associatedwith lower carbon emissions for low-
and middle-income economies, while for upper-middle- and high-income economies,
higher inequality increases emissions.
The motivation to incorporate a measure of freedom of the press in this model-
ing framework stems from Barrett and Graddy (2000) who extended Grossman and
Krueger’s (1995) proposed model by adding political freedom variables. They argue that
for citizens to demand higher levels of environmental quality as their income increase,
they have to be able to acquire information and to give voice to their preferences for envi-
ronmental quality. Moreover, governments also need to have incentives to satisfy this
demand. For these reasons, measures of civil and political freedoms should be included
as explanatory variables of environmental quality. In a similar fashion, Torras and Boyce
(1998) hypothesize that it is the distribution of power that contributes to different levels
of environmental quality in different countries. They use water and air quality from the
Global Environment Monitoring System data set, and access to safe water and sanita-
tion facilities from the national sources, as their dependent variables. Their independent
variables include per capita income measured in real purchasing power parity, income
inequality measured with the Gini coefficient, literacy rates, political rights and civil
liberties from a combination of two variables from Finn (1996), and urbanization. The
authors find that in poor countries, literacy, civil liberties, and political rights affect
environmental quality (Torras and Boyce, 1998). They also find that the best functional
form to describe the relationship in rich countries is cubic – in per capita income –
suggesting that at very high levels of income, pollution levels start to increase again
(Torras and Boyce, 1998).
The fact that the paths of rich countries and poor counties have developed so differ-
ently shows the likelihood of an omitted variable problem. While rich countries have
tended to decrease in pollution levels over time, this same trend cannot be found for
lower income countries (Roberts and Grimes, 1997). Many different factors have been
considered, including population density (Cropper and Griffiths, 1994) and openness
to trade (Suri and Chapman, 1998). Cropper and Griffiths show that decreasing the
population growth rate is not necessarily the best way to proceed in order to decrease
pollution levels, and Suri and Chapman show how the export of manufacturing goods
has contributed to rich countries producing more pollution. Magnani and Tubb (2008)
test whether an ageing population has any effect on environmental outcomes, finding
that an ageing population may impact the incipient pollution through lifestyle changes
while negatively affecting abatement due to either government budget constraints or
personal preferences. Given that the relationships between these other variables and
environmental degradation have not been conclusive, it is crucial to further investigate
other factors.
3. Data and variables
Weuse two differentmeasures of environmental policy in the empirical section. The first
dependent variable that is analyzed is taken from theOECDEnvironmental Policy Strin-
gency Index (Botta and Koźluk, 2014) and is available for 33 countries over the period
1990–2015 (see appendix table A1, sample 1). This dataset was created by the OECD to
internationally compare environmental stringency levels using a six-point scale where
0 is not stringent and 6 is very stringent. To build the index, the OECD looked at
14 different environmental policy instruments that primarily relate to climate and
air pollution. A detailed report on the composition of this measure can be found in
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Botta and Koźluk (2014). We hypothesize that there is a negative relationship between
inequality and environmental stringency.
The second dependent variable considered is from the OECD Environment
Database – Instruments used for Environmental Policy (OECD, 2016), also known as
the Policy Instruments for the Environment (PINE) database. The database contains
information on environmentally-related tax revenue as a percentage of total tax rev-
enue, as a percentage of GDP, and tax revenue per capita from 1994–2015 (OECD,
2017). It was created using a combination of quantitative and qualitative informa-
tion on different countries’ tradable permits, environmentally-motivated subsidies, fees
and charges, deposit-refund systems, voluntary approaches used for managing natural
resources, and environmentally-related taxes. Although the dataset is from the OECD,
it contains data for 82 countries, listed in table A1 in the appendix (sample 2). The addi-
tional countries ensure that our data set is not very homogenous in terms of income per
capita.
Freedom House compiles the lack of freedom of the press indicator, which is mea-
sured on a 100-point scale, with 0 representing having total freedom and 100 represent-
ing no freedom.2 The organization calculates each country’s numeric value using a base
of 23 methodical questions. The data is collected through field research, professional
contacts, reports from NGOs and governments, as well as from the domestic and news
media. This variable is an important addition to the study as it indicates the access to reli-
able information. In order for the populous to vote for politicians that support the green
movement, the citizens must first be informed about the threats of climate change and
the essential role that the government plays in fighting against these risks. We hypoth-
esize that there is a positive relationship between environmentally-friendly legislation
and freedom of the press. (Note that this implies a negative coefficient on the lack of
press freedom index.) As additional variables that proxy for the level of social and polit-
ical freedom in countries, we use two additional variables provided by FreedomHouse,3
namely lack of Political Rights and lack of Civil Liberties, both scaled from 1 to 7 and
increasing with the degree of lack of rights and liberties.
As a measure of inequality, we use the Gini coefficient from the Standardized World
Income Inequality Database (SWIID).4 The SWIID employs data from the Luxembourg
Income Study Database andWorld Income Inequality Database as well as other datasets
to create standardized inequality indicators (Solt, 2016). Due to the large variation that
exists between other datasets focusing on inequality, it is often difficult to compare dif-
ferent nations over time. Solt (2016) uses a missing-data algorithm to standardize the
UN University’s World Income Inequality Database, resulting in about 85 per cent of
observations having a standard error of less than three per cent. The aim of the SWIID is
to increase comparability between the measurements that are already available; it is for
this reason that we believe it is the best inequality measure to use.
GDP per capita and manufactured and services value added as a percentage of total
value added are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database
(WDI, 2018). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all the variables of interest.
It is important tomention that, due to data availability, there are very few low-income
countries in our sample. This implies that the results of the empirical estimations will not
2See the Freedom House website at https://freedomhouse.org.
3A version in Stata-friendly format is provided by Edgell (2018).
4Although the theory presented earlier in the paper refers to wealth inequality, the data on this variable
are not available for low-income countries and for this reason we use income inequality.
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Sample 1 (33 countries)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Environmental stringency 616 1.703 0.964 0.375 4.133
GDP per capita 616 30.198 20.644 0.596 91.594
Gini (net) 616 33.448 8.555 21.9 58.8
Lack of press freedom 616 27.157 18.939 5 89
Manuf. VA% 616 18.241 5.241 6.882 33.354
Services VA% 616 65.434 9.410 33.569 81.079
Lack of civil liberties 616 1.929 1.356 1 7
Lack of political rights 616 1.646 1.457 1 7
Sample 2 (82 countries)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total env. tax per capita 1,480 459.002 474.835 −231.248 2,502.393
GDP per capita 1,480 19.893 21.303 0.272 110.001
Gini (net) 1,480 37.246 9.311 21.1 61
Lack of press freedom 1,480 34.082 20.997 5 87
Manuf. VA% 1,437 16.534 5.823 3.679 39.465
Services VA% 1,480 62.514 10.315 26.124 88.538
Lack of civil liberties 1,480 2.353 1.450 1 6
Lack of political rights 1,480 2.201 1.719 1 7
Notes:Stringency ranges from0 (not stringent) to 6 (very stringent). GDPper capita and total tax per capita are inUS$1,000.
Lack of press freedom ranges from 0 (total freedom) to 100 (no freedom). Lack of civil liberties and political rights range
from 1, being the most free, to 7, being the least free.
reflect the upward part of the typical EKC, and this has to be taken into account when
interpreting the results.
4. Theoretical background, empirical model andmain results
4.1 Environmental degradation, income inequality and freedom of the press
Since environmental degradation has significant negative externalities, to avoid high
levels of pollution, themarket failure problemneeds to be addressed. It is widely accepted
by the literature that as GDP per capita increases, the society becomes better able to solve
this market failure. To better understand the relationship between economic growth,
environmental abatement, and preferences, we follow the theoretical background pre-
sented in Magnani (2000). She takes from Baldwin (1995) the division of pollution into
two components: incipient pollution and abatement. Incipient pollution, represented by
Iit, is the amount of pollution a country would produce at its current level and composi-
tion of output if there were no environmental costs. Hence, if a country has high taxation
on pollution and large environmental costs, then the level of incipient pollution will be
much higher than the country’s actual level of pollution. This difference will be consid-
erably reduced for a country that has relatively low taxes on pollution and low costs for
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environmental damage. The difference between incipient pollution and actual pollution
is referred to as abatement and is represented by Eit. Countries with the highest levels
of taxation on pollutants will thus also have higher abatement levels. Hence, the level of
abatement is given by
Eit = Iit − mit , (1)
where Eit is the abatement level, Iit is the incipient pollution of a country, andmit is the
pollution level in any given country i at time t.
Stern et al. (1996), among others, argue that growth has a positive impact on incip-
ient pollution, Iit = f (Yit), I′(.) > 0, where Yit represents the economic wellbeing of a
country at time t. For instance, when developing countries start to grow, they begin
to industrialize and thus the incipient pollution level, Iit, also rises. Economic growth
often translates into increased consumption levels, which also increases incipient pol-
lution. This scale effect could be greater than the effect that countries experience when
moving into the service industries and out of manufacturing, the so-called composition
effect (Grossman andKrueger, 1995). Countries start to better protect their environment
when citizens’ demand for higher environmental quality is large enough.Wewould then
expect that environmental abatement, Eit, increases alongside economic growth. This is
especially true if there is a high income-elasticity for environmental standards (Antle and
Heidebrink, 1995). If we assume that countries’ environmental policies reflect individ-
ual preferences, then it is plausible to assume that environmental policy totally adjusts
to these preferences, and hence
(∂Eit/∂Dit) = 1, (2)
which results in:
(∂mit/∂Yit) < 0 if ε > (∂Iit/∂Yit)(Yit/Iit), where ε ≡ (∂Dit/∂Yit)(Yit/Dit), (3)
where ε represents the income elasticity of the demand for environmental quality; Dit
represents the demand for environmental quality in country i at time t; Yit equals the
economic wellbeing; and I represents incipient pollution (Magnani, 2000). This shows
that if the demand for environmental quality is high, then in the latter stages of growth
there will be an increase in environmental abatement and hencemore stringent environ-
mental policies. For instance, when individuals have a high-income elasticity of demand
for environmental quality, the level of environmental protection will be highly depen-
dent on how much income they have. It is only when the income elasticity of demand is
high that the income levels play a strong role in improving environmental outcomes. The
income elasticity curve shows why the EKC predicts an inverted U shape with respect
to economic growth. However, as Magnani (2000) pointed out, it is worth questioning
whether economic growth alone is enough to predict environmental abatement.
We hypothesize that inequality and freedom of the press also play a role in determin-
ing environmental abatement. If the power to elect change is in the hands of too few
individuals, then it is possible that the outcome will disproportionately benefit those in
power. When economic means and political power are concentrated in the hands of a
few, those at the top of the income distribution will have a greater chance of having their
preferences met as opposed to those at the bottom of the spectrum.
Magnani (2000) applies the median voter theorem (Congleton, 2004) when investi-
gating taxes on pollution, as the preferences are single-peaked and there is a monotonic
relationship between the voter’s relative income and his or her ideal policy. Amonotonic
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relationship refers to the fact that voters’ preferences most likely align with their income
levels, and that as their income levels change, their preferred environmental policy also
adjusts accordingly. If τ represents taxes, l represents an individual, m is the index for
the median voter, γ l is the preference parameter, and R= (ym/Y) – meaning R repre-
sents the ratio between median income, ym, and average income, Y – then a politician
is able to maximize the indirect utility function of the median voter and the equilibrium
tax rate is given by
τ ∗ = 1 − R(1/γm), (4)
to get ε ≡ (δγm/δR)(R/γm) > 1. This shows that if the income elasticity ε of themedian
voter’s preference γm for lower levels of environmental degradation is greater than 1,
then pro-environment public expenditure is an increasing function of income equality;
thus
E∗ = f (Y , ym/Y). (5)
Moreover, according to Magnani (2000), whether or not abatement would respond
to increasing per capita income positively depends on the interdependence between eco-
nomic inequality and average income. For this reason, the effect of income inequality on
environmental stringency depends on the level of per capita income.
In addition, according to Barrett and Graddy (2000), the level of abatement and the
induced environmental-policy response do not only depend on the prosperity of the
countries, but also on the possibilities that individuals have to acquire information about
the level of environmental quality. For instance, those policy responses will depend on
the level of political and civil freedoms.
Therefore, we test the reduced form in (5) in the next section of this paper, extended
with a component that reflects the level of information of the citizens and a second that
accounts for the structure of the economy.
4.2 Model specification
The model specification follows the same logic as Magnani’s (2000), and builds off of
the previous research on environmental standards that often focused on per capita emis-
sions; we instead focus on environmental policy as the outcome variable. The baseline
model includes GDP per capita (xit), the net Gini coefficient (rit), the index of freedom
of the press (pit), and the share of manufacturing/services value added in total va (vait),
eit = α + β0 xit + β1 rit + β2 pit + β3 vait + ϕt + uit , (6)
where eit is our environmental policy variable of interest. The error term can be decom-
posed (Magnani, 2000) into unobservable country-specific effects, represented by μi,
and a white noise component denoted εit, with uit =μi + εit. The unobserved effects
are controlled for by estimating (6) using panel data techniques. Technology progress
is assumed to be common to all countries and time variant and is captured by the
year-specific dummy variables, ϕt , which are added to all models.
In order to test if there is a non-linear relationship between GDP per capita and
environmentally-friendly legislation – such as posited by the EKC -we include the square
of GDP per capita in our second specification, and in a third one we investigate whether
the effect of inequality on the outcome variables may be non-linear by adding also the
squared term of the Gini.
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Furthermore, we investigate if the inequality effect depends on the level of develop-
ment in the country through the interaction term between theGini variable and theGDP
per capita variable, as hypothesized by Magnani (2000) and Grunewald et al. (2017),
and also consider an interaction term between our two target variables, namely, lack of
freedom of the press and the Gini coefficient.
Panel data methods allow us to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Fixed effects
methods treat the unobserved differences between countries, μi, as a set of fixed param-
eters that can be directly estimated using country dummies or taking within differences
of the variables in the estimating equations (Allison, 2009). As an alternative, the ran-
dom effects model uses the unobserved heterogeneity to construct the variance of the
residuals. In a generalized least squares procedure, the estimated variance is then used
to re-weight the observations. However, this is only valid if the unobserved effects are
uncorrelated with all of the explanatory variables. We use a regression-based Hausman-
type test to determine if we should use random effects (RE) or fixed effects (FE)
(Hausman, 1978; Mundlak, 1978). If the test rejects the null hypothesis that the esti-
mates from both RE and FE are statistically similar, it is likely that the REmodel is biased
(Wooldridge, 2016). The reason is that FE is still unbiasedwhether or not the unobserved
variables are correlated with the explanatory variables. We tested the hypothesis of no
systematic difference between FE and RE and found that it was rejected by the test for the
smaller sample of OECD+BRIICS countries, but only in some cases for the second sam-
ple and thus we present the corresponding results in our main analysis. The results from
the RE regressions augmented with the averages of the time variant variables (Mundlak
approach) are located in the appendix,5 in tables A2 and A3. Those results are used to
run a regression-based Hausman test, which tests for the joint significance of the aver-
ages of the time-variant coefficients. The test results are shown at the bottom of tables
A2 and A3. Regarding year FE, ϕt , those are included in all the regressions as a proxy
for technology progress. It is important to notice that whereas the time specific effects
explain 39 per cent of the variation of the first dependent variable (environmental policy
stringency, EPS), they only explain less than 1 per cent of the second, environmental tax
revenue per capita (ETR). The country specific effects instead explain 34 per cent of the
variability of EPS and 94 per cent of the variability of ETR. In addition, given the nature
of the dependent variables, we also estimated a panel-Poisson model, whose results can
also be found in the appendix, in tables A4 and A5.
4.3 Main results
The models specified in the previous subsection have been estimated for two differ-
ent dependent variables and the corresponding sample of countries using data over the
period 1994–2015. Panel data methodology has been used to account for unobserved
country-specific heterogeneity that is country specific and time invariant. For the sam-
ple of OECD+BRIICS, an RE model was always rejected according to the Hausman
test,6 whereas for the sample of 82 countries this was not the case.
5We used the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test to test for RE versus pooled OLS (Woodridge,
2016) and obtained a p-value= 0.000, meaning we should not use pooled OLS.
6The so-called Mundlak (1978) approach is suitable for implementing a robust Hausman test, which
consists of testing for the joint significance of the averaged variables added to the model. When the test
rejects the null hypothesis of non-significance of the considered coefficients, a pure RE approach would
provide biased results.
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Table 2. Main results for stringency of environmental laws
Explanatory (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
variables linear quadr1 quadr2 interac CivLib PolRig
GDP per cap. 0.0711*** 0.108*** 0.0714*** 0.0761 0.0720*** 0.0651***
[0.0190] [0.0387] [0.0196] [0.0481] [0.0202] [0.0203]
Gini (net) 0.0224 0.0271 0.00782 0.0245 0.0239 0.0201
[0.0423] [0.0425] [0.174] [0.0505] [0.0428] [0.0381]
Lack of press
freedom
−0.0153** −0.0139* −0.0153** −0.0151** −0.0148* −0.0220***
[0.00737] [0.00738] [0.00734] [0.00680] [0.00797] [0.00783]
Manuf. VA% −0.0458** −0.0473** −0.0456** −0.0460** −0.0463** −0.0386
[0.0209] [0.0199] [0.0207] [0.0207] [0.0211] [0.0238]
GDP per cap. sq. −0.000336
[0.000256]














Country & time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 616 616 616 616 616 616
R2 within 0.750 0.753 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.756
R2 overall 0.874 0.875 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.877
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1. The dependent variable
is stringency of environmental laws. GDP per capita is in US$1,000. Country and year dummies added in all columns, not
shown to save space. Sample of 33 countries over the period 1994–2015.
Dependent variable: environmental stringency.
Table 2 shows our results for the panel regression using two-ways fixed – country
and time FE – considering as explanatory variables of environmental policy stringency:
GDP per capita, the Gini coefficient, lack of freedom of the press, and the share of
manufacturing value added in the economy.
The results in specification (1) of table 2 indicate that the coefficient of lack of freedom
of the press had the expected negative and significant correlation with environmental
stringency at the 5 per cent level. GDP per capita shows a positive coefficient, significant
at the 1 per cent level, which means that as people’s incomes increase, their concern for
the environment also increases. In particular, an increase ofGDPper capita ofUS$13,500
is associated with an increase in the index of environmental policy stringency by 1 stan-
dard deviation. However, the Gini coefficient is not statistically significant. It is worth
noticing that the Gini coefficient had a negative and significant coefficient when the
model was estimated without country FE.
In specification (2) in table 2, we test whether the relationship between per capita
income and environmental stringency is non-linear, as suggested by the EKC hypothe-
sis. We add the square of GDP per capita as a regressor and find that it is not statistically
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significant at conventional levels, thus implying that the relationship between GDP per
capita and environmental stringency is linear and environmental stringency monoton-
ically increases with GDP per capita. The statistical significance of lack of freedom of
the press is now weaker in this model, as expected. Similarly, we test whether the Gini
coefficient has a non-linear relationship with environmental stringency and find that the
squared Gini coefficient is not statistically significant (column (3)). In specification (4)
of table 2, the interaction betweenGDP per capita and the Gini coefficient is added to the
model to test whether the effect of inequality varies with income. We find that the cor-
responding coefficient is also not statistically significant. In all specifications we allow
for the model to be flexible by allowing for non-linear time effects through the use of
year dummies. The coefficients of the year dummies are (jointly) significantly different
from zero and explain almost 40 per cent of the variability in the dependent variables,
as pointed out before. Freedom of the press is found to be significant in determining
environmental stringency in all models and has the expected negative sign.7 If there is
less freedom of the press (the index increases from 20 to 40, for example), environmental
policy stringency will decrease by 0.3 (since the EP index varies from 0.33 to 4.13, this is
an economically non-negligible effect). In columns (4) and (5), we add twomeasures that
are closely related to lack of freedom of the press, namely, lack of civil liberties and lack
of political rights, respectively. The former enters the model with the expected sign, but
its coefficient is not statistically significant, whereas the latter is statistically significant
only at the ten per cent level and does not change the sign or the significance of the coef-
ficient obtained for lack of freedom of the press. Since the correlation between the three
proxies is high (around 0.91 per cent), we also estimated the model with only the latter
two variables and the results indicate that neither civil liberties nor political rights are
statistically significant, not even at the 10 per cent level.
In table 3, we present the main results for the second dependent variable consid-
ered, namely environmental tax revenue per capita. As indicated by the results of the
regression-based Hausman test (table A3 in the appendix), an FE specification is pre-
ferred when the squared term of GDP per capita is included in the model, otherwise the
RE specification is preferred. Therefore, we estimate the model with RE in all columns
of table 3, apart from (3) and (4).
For the first specification8 in table 3 we find that, as expected, less press freedom
is negatively correlated with environmental tax revenue per capita, with a coefficient
significant at the 5 per cent level inmodel (1). Thismeans thatwhen the press in a country
starts to become less free (their freedom of the press score moves from a 10 to a 30, for
example), then the amount of environmental tax revenue per capita decreases by about
e52. This could be the case as people have less reliable information available to them,
which is needed if they are going tomake an informed decision regarding environmental
policy. Also, similar to our regressions with environmental stringency, GDP per capita
shows a positive and significant coefficient at the 1 per cent level and the coefficient of
the Gini has the expected negative sign, which is statistically significant at the 5 per cent
7We also tested for a squared term in lack of freedom of the press and the estimated coefficient was not
statistically significant at conventional levels. The same was the case for the interaction between lack of
freedom of the press and the Gini.
8We added services value added as a percentage of total value added in the country instead of the cor-
responding figure for manufactures (as in table 2) because in this model the latter variable was never
statistically significant, whereas the former was in some cases, and was also available for more observations.
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Table 3. Main results for total environmental tax revenue per capita
Explanatory (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
variables linear quadr1 quadr2 interac CivLib PolRigh ManuVA
GDP per cap. 13.22*** 34.53*** 34.48*** 38.86*** 38.55*** 38.79*** 38.70***
[2.010] [8.030] [8.059] [11.62] [11.36] [11.59] [12.21]
Gini (net) −8.349** −3.527 −15.47 −1.425 −0.600 −1.482 −0.968
[4.009] [5.659] [35.58] [4.655] [4.553] [4.597] [4.817]
Press freedom −2.599** −1.889 −1.917 −2.402* −1.316 −2.487** −2.684*
[1.267] [1.443] [1.425] [1.298] [1.057] [1.214] [1.431]
Serv. VA% 3.885** 3.416* 3.308* 4.089** 3.736** 4.100**
[1.833] [1.834] [1.878] [1.908] [1.826] [1.920]
GDP per cap. sq. −0.181*** −0.179**
[0.0680] [0.0688]




−0.852** −0.848*** −0.850** −0.825**











Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Turning point GDP 95.387
Observations 1,480 1,480 1,480 1,480 1,480 1,480 1,437
Method RE FE FE RE RE RE RE
R2 within 0.267 0.268
R2 overall 0.960 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.964 0.963 0.963
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1. The dependent variable
is total environmental tax revenue per capita (in US$1,000). GDP per capita is in US$1,000. Country and year dummies
added in all columns, not shown to save space. Sample of 82 countries over the period 1994–2015. FE (RE) denotes that a
model with country fixed effects (random effects) has been estimated.
Dependent variable: environmental tax revenue per capita
level. An increase in the Gini of 10 percentage points is associated with a decrease in
environmental tax revenue per capita of about US$83.
In specification (2) the squared of GDP per capita is added, whose coefficient is statis-
tically significant at the 5 per cent level, indicating that there is a non-linear relationship
between income and the outcome variable. Freedom of the press loses its significance
under this specification. We also test whether there is a non-linear relationship between
the Gini coefficient and environmental tax revenue per capita and find that the coeffi-
cient of the Gini squared is not statistically significant at conventional levels in column
(3) of table 3. Given that the turning point for the EKC with respect to GDP per capita
is out of sample, with the only exception being Luxembourg, we proceed in the next
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column including an interaction between GDP per capita and the Gini coefficient
instead of the squared term.
In the 4th specification of table 3, the results show that the interaction between the
Gini and GDP per capita shows a negative and significant coefficient, and the corre-
sponding marginal effect is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, indicating that
the partial negative effect of inequality on environmental taxes increases with income
per capita. In columns (5) and (6) we add lack of civil liberties and lack of political rights
respectively as control variables. Whereas the former is statistically significant at the 1
per cent level and shows the expected negative sign, the second is not. An improvement
in political rightsmoving from the top to themiddle of the ranking (from 7 to 3.5) will be
associated with an increase in environmental tax revenues of about e126.50 per capita.
In this model, lack of press freedom is not shown to be statistically significant, but since
the correlation between this variable and civil liberties is around 90 per cent, this is not
surprising. Finally, column (7) includes as a control variable the value added in theman-
ufacturing sector as a percentage as total value added and shows that it is not relevant
in this model and even reduces the sample size. Similar to the models in table 2, time
FE have been added in all models and are jointly significant, however in this case they
explain less than 1 per cent of the variability of the dependent variable.
In our next estimations, we divide up the sample of countries by income per capita
levels into two groups. We create a ‘high income’ group and a ‘middle-low income’
group using the World Bank definition in 2016 (countries with GNI per capita higher
than US$12,000; see table A1 in the appendix). The reason for doing that is that the
correlations of the Gini coefficient and freedom of the press with environmental strin-
gency and environmental tax revenue per capita could vary depending on how rich
countries are. For instance, when countries have a lower GDP per capita, they are more
concerned with catching up to the rest of the world than with protecting the environ-
ment. Thus, they might vote for policies that would increase their economic wealth as
opposed to protecting the environment. On the other side of the spectrum, when coun-
tries reach a certain level of GDP per capita, citizens’ preferences may change and cause
them to care more about the environmental quality. This is the idea behind the EKC. It
could be the case that inequality and freedom of the press only play a significant role for
certain income levels, which is the reasonwhywe divided up the sample into two groups.
Table 4 shows the results when environmental stringency is used as a dependent
variable and for above-average income per capita (seen in the left side of the table, spec-
ifications (1)–(4)), and below-average income per capita (seen in specifications (5)–(8)).
Similar results are presented for the second outcome variable, environmental tax revenue
per capita, in table 5. When investigating the effect of the Gini coefficient in table 4, we
see that the Gini only has a significant effect for specifications (5) to (8) and the effect is
non-linear, suggesting that the inequality has a negative effect on the outcome variable
only before a certain inequality level is reached (the turning point is for Gini= 46.25).
Therefore, rising inequality is in general negatively correlated with the income dedicated
to protecting the environment and could indicate that more egalitarian societies tend to
better protect the environment.
The group of countries considered here are Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico,
Russia and South Africa; therefore it is important to remark that, for these new industri-
alized countries, both freedomof the press and inequality play an important role in shap-
ing environmental policy stringency. Concerning inequality, reductions in inequality
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Table 4. Results by income group for stringency of environmental law
High-income countries Non high-income countries
Explanatory (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
variables linear quadr1 quadr2 interac linear quadr1 quadr2 interac
GDP per cap. 0.0229 0.0677** 0.0690** 0.135* 0.207** 0.390*** 0.466*** 0.407*
[0.0152] [0.0328] [0.0321] [0.0658] [0.0797] [0.0896] [0.108] [0.212]
GDP per cap. sq. −0.000391 −0.000395 −0.000458** −0.0140* −0.0172* −0.0139
[0.000259] [0.000256] [0.000218] [0.00716] [0.00821] [0.00749]
Gini (net) 0.0128 0.0213 −0.0675 0.0883 0.0187 −0.0166 −0.395* −0.0140
[0.0552] [0.0561] [0.322] [0.0986] [0.0278] [0.0278] [0.175] [0.0266]
Gini (net) sq. 0.00157 0.00427*
[0.00625] [0.00189]
Press freedom −0.0111 −0.00714 −0.00769 −0.00277 −0.0203** −0.0190** −0.0183** −0.0188**
[0.00789] [0.00816] [0.00812] [0.0103] [0.00757] [0.00716] [0.00574] [0.00655]
ManuVA% −0.0550* −0.0597** −0.0591** −0.0634** −0.0111 −0.0188 −0.0115 −0.0195
[0.0293] [0.0268] [0.0262] [0.0276] [0.0169] [0.0173] [0.0160] [0.0167]
Gini×GDP per cap. −0.00208 −0.000481
[0.00212] [0.00544]
Turning point GDP 147.379 13.546
Turning point Gini 46.253
Observations 455 455 455 455 161 161 161 161
R-squared 0.866 0.869 0.866 0.866 0.730 0.744 0.752 0.730
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1. Sample split by GDP per capita. GDP per capita is in US$1,000. Country and year dummies added
in all columns, not shown to save space. Sample from 1994–2015 with 25 countries in left panel with GDP per capita>12 in 2015, and 8 in the right panel (listed in table A1, sample 1). Countries
with lower income per capita are: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and Turkey.























Table 5. Results by income group for environmental tax revenue per capita
High-income countries Non high-income countries
Explanatory (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
variables linear quadr1 quadr2 interac linear quadr1 quadr2 interac
GDP per cap. 5.815** 39.70*** 39.70*** 43.65*** 12.79*** 37.93* 34.59*** 66.69***
[2.298] [4.232] [4.220] [8.647] [2.697] [19.83] [6.801] [16.08]
GDP per cap. Sq. −0.325*** −0.321*** −0.156 −0.127***
[0.0354] [0.0358] [0.106] [0.0442]
Gini (net) −2.618 −2.425 −40.50 28.82*** −5.938 −2.771 −60.67** 1.062
[5.727] [5.367] [45.20] [10.03] [6.979] [6.346] [29.57] [1.975]
Gini (net) sq. 0.655 0.632**
[0.737] [0.311]
Press freedom −4.040*** −1.348 −1.565 −2.616** −1.904 −1.809 −1.968** −2.386**
[1.298] [1.230] [1.237] [1.298] [1.904] [1.868] [0.903] [0.939]
5.147* 0.0985 −0.00775 4.248 3.196 2.891 2.829*** 3.075***
[2.784] [2.314] [2.299] [2.933] [2.036] [2.079] [0.988] [1.007]
Gini×GDP per cap. −1.309*** −1.565***
[0.289] [0.476]
Turning point GDP 61.077 136.181
Turning point Gini 47.998
Observations 694 694 694 694 786 786 786 786
R-squared 0.302 0.408 0.410 0.444 0.140 0.177 0.188 0.254
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1. Sample split by GDP per capita. GDP per capita is in US$1,000. Country and year dummies added
in all columns, not shown to save space. The sample includes 36 high-income countries with GPD per capita>12 in 2015 in the left-panel and 46 in the right panel (listed in table A1, sample 2).
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will favor increases in environmental stringency for not very high levels of Gini. How-
ever, the Gini coefficient is not statistically significant for rich countries in any of the
specifications. Concerning lack of freedom of the press, the results indicate that this
variable is strongly relevant for specifications (5) to (8), indicating that for new indus-
trialized countries more freedom of the press (decrease in the variable) will be positively
associated with more environmental policy stringency.
The results shown in table 5 when the outcome variable is environmental tax revenue
per capita are along a similar line as those found for environmental stringency. In partic-
ular, less freedom of the press contributes tomore environmental revenues per capita for
rich and poor countries. But for rich countries, the effect vanishes once the EKC specifi-
cation is considered inmodel (2), whereas for less-rich andpoor countries, the coefficient
is statistically significant after including the squared GDP term and the squared of the
Gini in specification (7) and also when including the interaction between Gini and GDP
per capita in (8). Hence, a non-linear relationship is also found for the Gini index, which
is more prevalent for specifications (5)–(8) including less-rich countries.
4.4 Robustness checks
As robustness, we first estimated several variations of the models presented in the previ-
ous section.When including the interaction between the Gini and lack of press freedom,
it was never statistically significant. The same was the case for the interaction between
Gini and political rights.9
As a second robustness check, we estimated a model with interactions between the
dummy variable for high-income countries and all the regressors and tested for the
equality of the coefficients. The test indicates that only for the coefficients on the income
variables (GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared) and the time dummy variables
can we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal. Indeed, it can be seen
in tables 4 and 5 that the turning points for the income variable are very different in the
left- and right-hand side of the tables.
Finally, we estimated a Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood model, due to the fact
that the dependent variables have limited support. The results are presented in tables
table A4 and table A5 in the appendix and in general confirm our main outcomes.
5. Conclusions
In this paper it is hypothesized that not only the level of income per capita but also
income inequality is expected to play a role as a determinant of environmental reg-
ulations, and that the degree of lack of freedom of the press is also correlated with
environmental policy stringency. By considering as determinants of environmental
stringency and environmental taxes a number of factors – namely income levels, income
inequality, the structure of the economy and a number of proxies for the degree of free-
dom of the press, political rights and civil liberties – a panel data model is estimated
for a cross section of countries over the period 1994–2015, which provides a number of
results.
First, we find that the first hypothesis that income inequality would be negatively
correlated with environmentally-friendly legislation is only valid for some countries.
9The results are available from the authors on request.
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While there is no direct linear effect of inequality on either of the two dependent vari-
ables considered, for environmental stringency such an effect is found for a subsample
of countries. This suggests that for some newly industrialized countries, equality favors
environmental stringency. For the second outcome variable considered, environmental
tax revenue, a non-linear effect of inequality is also found for a subset of non-rich coun-
tries. For our second hypothesis, we find that lack of freedom of the press is significantly
and negatively correlated to both environmental policy stringency and environmental
tax revenue. This indicates that a free press makes it more likely that people accept a
monetary loss to the benefit of the environment.
Moreover, there seems to be an EKC relation between income and environmental
tax revenue, suggesting that the EKC relation between income and actual emissions may
very well be driven by the ability of countries to implement regulations, but the turn-
ing point of GDP per capita is out of sample. In terms of inequality there seems to be
limited evidence of such a relation, although the results suggest it may apply for higher
income countries. The significant relationship between press freedom and environmen-
tal regulations may reflect other factors related to press freedom but not included in the
study. The results are not robust to the inclusion of political rights, whereas adding civil
liberties as a control variable does not affect the estimates.
Summarizing, our results suggest that the level of income per capita, the structure of
the economy and the degree of freedom of the press have an effect on environmental
policy. However, the effects are more nuanced than initially suspected and hence fur-
ther research is required to investigate other potential factors that affect environmental
policy.
One important limitation of this study is that the negative correlation between income
inequality and environmental policy stringency found in this paper cannot be general-
ized to low-income countries, since those are underrepresented in our dataset. The same
is the case for lack of political freedom, which is more prevalent in some poor coun-
tries. Potential suggestions for further research are the extension of the sample to also
include low-income countries using alternative proxies for environmental policy strin-
gency, such as for example the environmental performance index provided by Purdue
University.
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Appendices
Table A1. List of countries
Sample 1 Freq. Sample 2 Freq. Sample 2 (cont) Freq.
Australia 21 Argentina 22 Japan 21
Austria 19 Australia 21 Kazakhstan 18
Belgium 19 Austria 22 Kenya 7
Brazil 21 Bahamas, The 13 Latvia 21
Canada 22 Belgium 22 Lithuania 21
China 22 Belize 16 Malaysia 22
Czech Republic 19 Bolivia 22 Malta 17
Denmark 19 Brazil 8 Mauritius 6
Finland 19 Bulgaria 21 Mexico 21
France 22 Cabo Verde 17 Morocco 15
Germany 22 Cameroon 19 Netherlands 22
Greece 19 Canada 21 New Zealand 22
Hungary 19 Chile 22 Nicaragua 21
India 19 China 17 Niger 15
Indonesia 22 Colombia 15 Norway 22
Ireland 19 Congo, Dem. Rep. 9 Panama 22
Italy 22 Costa Rica 22 Paraguay 22
Japan 21 Cote d’Ivoire 22 Peru 22
Mexico 21 Croatia 18 Philippines 22
Netherlands 19 Cyprus 21 Poland 22
Norway 19 Czech Republic 22 Portugal 22
Poland 19 Denmark 22 Rwanda 19
Portugal 19 Dominican Republic 22 Senegal 10
Russian Federation 22 Ecuador 21 Serbia 13
Slovak Republic 19 El Salvador 15 Singapore 11
Slovenia 5 Estonia 21 Slovak Republic 22
South Africa 22 Finland 22 Slovenia 21
Spain 19 France 22 South Africa 22
Sweden 19 Germany 22 Spain 22
Switzerland 19 Ghana 4 Swaziland 15
Turkey 22 Greece 20 Sweden 22
United Kingdom 22 Guatemala 21 Switzerland 22
(continued)
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Table A1. Continued.
Sample 1 Freq. Sample 2 Freq. Sample 2 (cont) Freq.
United States 22 Guyana 14 Togo 11
Honduras 22 Trinidad and Tobago 12
Hungary 22 Tunisia 13
Iceland 21 Turkey 22
India 7 Uganda 20
Ireland 22 United Kingdom 22
Israel 20 United States 22
Italy 22 Uruguay 22
Jamaica 11 Venezuela, RB 21
Note: High-income countries in bold type.
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Table A2. Stringency of environmental policy RE Mundlak approach
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Explanatory variables linear quadr1 quadr2 interac
GDP per cap. 0.0664*** 0.0975*** 0.0669*** 0.0692
[0.0178] [0.0368] [0.0188] [0.0455]
Gini (net) 0.0141 0.0168 −0.0248 0.0132
[0.0412] [0.0403] [0.169] [0.0482]
Lack of press freedom −0.0133* −0.0125* −0.0133* −0.0133**
[0.00728] [0.00748] [0.00720] [0.00668]
ManuVA% −0.0425** −0.0424** −0.0420** −0.0421**
[0.0202] [0.0202] [0.0201] [0.0199]
GDP per cap. sq. −0.000286
[0.000252]
Gini (net) sq. 0.000497
[0.00239]
Gini×GDP per cap. −9.85e-05
[0.00150]
Av. GDP per cap. −0.0600*** −0.0592 −0.0614*** −0.0779
[0.0174] [0.0395] [0.0183] [0.0570]
Av. Gini (net) −0.0506 −0.0468 0.0869 −0.0553
[0.0433] [0.0426] [0.207] [0.0489]
Av. lack of press freedom 0.00290 0.00754 −0.00175 0.00325
[0.00890] [0.00794] [0.00976] [0.00791]
Av. ManuVA% 0.0311 0.0350 0.0395 0.0330
[0.0275] [0.0269] [0.0299] [0.0277]
Av. GDP per cap. sq. −9.79× 10−5
[0.000316]
Av. Gini (net) sq. −0.00176
[0.00286]
Av. Gini×GDP per cap. 0.000646
[0.00193]
Robust ‘Hausman type’ (p value) 0.0051 0.0028 0.0018 0.0048
Observations 616 616 616 616
Number of countries 33 33 33 33
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1. Sample split by GDP
per capita. GDP per capita is in US$1,000. Country and year dummies added in all columns, not shown to save space. The
robust Hausman type test is a test of the joint significance of the averaged time-variant variables, and indicates rejection
of the null hypothesis of non-significance. Hence FE is preferred to RE estimation.
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Table A3. Total environmental tax revenue per capita RE Mundlak approach
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Explanatory variables linear quadr1 quadr2 interac
GDP per cap. 11.40*** 33.69*** 33.60*** 37.11**
[2.791] [7.956] [7.990] [16.05]
Gini (net) −4.950 −3.518 −18.45 1.098
[5.738] [5.606] [35.00] [6.588]
Press freedom −2.503* −1.822 −1.862 −2.341
[1.505] [1.489] [1.476] [1.599]
ServVA % 3.130 3.039* 2.942 3.444*
[2.030] [1.767] [1.815] [2.076]
GDP per cap. sq −0.178*** −0.176**
[0.0685] [0.0694]
Gini (net) sq. 0.179
[0.384]
Gini×GDP per cap. −0.831*
[0.460]
Average GDP per cap. 2.717 −25.66*** −27.41*** 0.656
[3.415] [8.876] [9.144] [13.23]
Average Gini (net) −7.686 −10.52* −64.88* −6.672
[5.935] [5.771] [36.32] [6.369]
Average press freedom 0.877 −0.195 0.867 0.829
[2.591] [2.666] [2.427] [2.339]
Average SErVA% −1.156 0.167 1.061 6.974*
[3.335] [2.922] [2.938] [3.571]
Average GDP per cap. sq. 0.253*** 0.258***
[0.0701] [0.0703]
Average Gini (net) sq. 0.683*
[0.411]
Average Gini×GDP per cap. 0.0131
[0.413]
Robust ‘Hausman type’ (p value) 0.481 0.0034 0.004 0.794
Observations 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541
Number of countries 82 82 82 82
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1. Sample split by GDP
per capita. GDP per capita is in US$1,000. Country and year dummies added in all columns, not shown to save space. The
robust Hausman type test is a test of the joint significance of the averaged time-variant variables, and indicates rejection
of the null hypothesis of non-significance. Hence FE is preferred to RE estimation.
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Table A4. Results by income group for stringency of environmental policy
High-income countries Non high-income countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Explanatory variables linear quadr1 quadr2 interac linear quadr1 quadr2 interac
GDP per cap. 0.0139 0.0495* 0.0535** 0.0776* 0.200*** 0.282*** 0.343*** 0.282
[0.00913] [0.0257] [0.0245] [0.0414] [0.0647] [0.0736] [0.0752] [0.176]
GDP per cap. sq. −0.000314 −0.000327 −0.000339* −0.00683 −0.00931 −0.00683
[0.000229] [0.000223] [0.000203] [0.00658] [0.00675] [0.00657]
Gini (net) −0.0285 −0.0237 −0.332* 0.00722 0.0344 0.0154 −0.398*** 0.0155
[0.0319] [0.0326] [0.187] [0.0671] [0.0213] [0.0279] [0.121] [0.0258]
Gini (net) sq. 0.00545 0.00473***
[0.00360] [0.00134]
Press freedom −0.0114* −0.00800 −0.00968 −0.00628 −0.0234*** −0.0225*** −0.0219*** −0.0225***
[0.00685] [0.00713] [0.00600] [0.00731] [0.00581] [0.00548] [0.00402] [0.00522]
ManuVA% −0.0301 −0.0324* −0.0316* −0.0334* −0.0195 −0.0241 −0.0216 −0.0242
[0.0211] [0.0196] [0.0188] [0.0197] [0.0194] [0.0193] [0.0152] [0.0181]
Gini×GDP per cap. −0.000886 −2.21× 10−5
[0.00148] [0.00410]
Turning point Gini
Observations 455 455 455 455 161 161 161 161
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 8 8 8 8
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1. Sample split by GDP per capita. GDP per capita is in US$1,000. Country and year dummies added
in all columns, not shown to save space.
Poisson pseudo likelihood estimation.























Table A5. Results by income group for total environmental tax revenue per capita
High-income countries Non high-income countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Explanatory variables linear quadr1 quadr2 interac linear quadr1 quadr2 interac
GDP per cap. −0.00276 0.0474*** 0.0485*** 0.0989*** 0.00111 0.146** 0.132** 0.233***
[0.00627] [0.0135] [0.0123] [0.0345] [0.00730] [0.0649] [0.0649] [0.0752]
GDP per cap. sq. −0.000428*** −0.000419*** −0.000454*** −0.000812** −0.000706* −0.000780**
[0.000111] [0.000101] [0.000103] [0.000365] [0.000378] [0.000334]
Gini (net) −0.00853 −0.00806 −0.181* 0.0404 −0.0318 0.0123 −0.136 0.0515
[0.0191] [0.0179] [0.103] [0.0430] [0.0350] [0.0369] [0.249] [0.0399]
Gini (net) sq. 0.00308* 0.00168
[0.00182] [0.00271]
Press freedom −0.00979** −0.00536 −0.00660* −0.00297 −0.0124 −0.0104 −0.0115** −0.0129**
[0.00417] [0.00367] [0.00356] [0.00340] [0.00761] [0.00643] [0.00581] [0.00604]
SerVA% 0.00564 −0.00843 −0.00815 −0.00930 0.0164 0.0147 0.0140 0.0153
[0.00791] [0.00548] [0.00576] [0.00574] [0.0100] [0.0117] [0.0121] [0.0120]
Gini×GDP per cap. −0.00169* −0.00288**
[0.000945] [0.00119]
Turning point GDP 55.373 89.901
Observations 747 747 747 747 787 787 787 787
Number of countries 36 36 36 36 46 46 46 46
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1. Sample split by GDP per capita. GDP per capita is in US$1,000. Country and year dummies added
in all columns, not shown to save space.
Poisson pseudo likelihood estimation.
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